Abstract
This paper examines Donald Trump’s stance on foreign diplomacy, specifically his policy of utilising commercial and financial incentives to resolve conflicts and attract non-allied regimes toward the United States. Instead of relying on conventional diplomatic means or international organisations, Trump frequently emphasised individual business agreements as vehicles for cooperation, arguing that shared economic interests could foster collaboration and stability. It examines significant case studies, including US-North Korea discussions, the Abraham Accords in the Middle East, and US-China economic ties, to determine if such transactional paradigms resulted in genuine diplomatic outcomes or merely short-term tactical gains. The paper evaluates key case studies such as the U.S.-North Korea negotiations, the Abraham Accords in the Middle East, and U.S.-China trade relations to analyse whether this transactional model created meaningful diplomatic outcomes or merely short-term tactical advantages. By situating Trump’s approach within the broader theory of “commercial peace” and realist foreign policy frameworks, the study assesses its effectiveness, sustainability, and implications for future diplomatic paradigms.
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